What started out as a division with a cult-like following ended up another irrelevant brand within the GM hierarchy. This is the story of how GM fumbled a golden opportunity to reinvent itself over the last 20+ years.
The automotive press wasn’t all that impressed by the product, stating that it was just an ordinary car with average handling, average fuel mileage, and with a rather noisy, unrefined engine, especially in the DOHC version. While the basic reviews of the Saturn were lukewarm at best, it was the buying experience that brought most of the success of the brand, with a whole new approach in retailing vehicles. It started with carefully choosing the right dealers. Each Saturn store was set up as a stand-alone dealership in which the overall design of the dealership had to follow key design parameters set by the division. Each of these items included square footage, interior layout, and exterior design right down to the furnishings. These retailers also had to follow the one-price mantra in which there was a low-pressure, no-haggle pricing structure. The story behind this was said to be a study of consumer preference in which many participants would rather have a root canal done than step foot in a showroom to purchase a car. The Saturn Way actually relaxed car shoppers and they bought almost 50,000 units right off the bat and within two years more than 250,000 of what was essentially a one-car brand.
It was also the first time in which Saturn ranked number one in new car sales per retailer, a feat that no other domestic nameplate held in over a decade. The company was also very active in community organizations and charitable work, often closely aligned with the general demographic or those who purchased Saturns. By 1995 Saturn sold over a million cars, and introduced their no-haggle approach to the used car market, cementing their relationship with car buyers who were looking for something other than a small sedan, wagon, or sports coupe.